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Abstract
In the past 25 years, partnership diplomacy has gradually become an indispen-
sable component in China's grand diplomacy strategy. Between 1993 and the 
end of 2017, China established more than 100 partnerships with the outside 
world. To better understand the evolution of China's strategy for diplomacy 
we need to know how these partnerships are formed and what motivates 
China to foster its partnership network. Although the importance of this strat-
egy has been identiﬁed, the current literature does not yet include signiﬁcant 
study of China's partnership network. This article attempts to ﬁll this gap 
by assessing existing literature on partnership and government documents, 
interpreting the diversiﬁed labels and grades of partnerships, and analysing 
the network's evolution. It also attempts to estimate possible challenges fac-
ing China in the future expansion of its global partnership network. It argues 
that, although China intends to further extend its global inﬂuence and explore 
potential beneﬁts through its partnerships, because of the challenges ahead 
its partnership network is still an aspiration rather than a realistic blueprint. 
Keywords: partnership, Chinese foreign policy, grand diplomatic strategy
Introduction
Since 1993, when China established its ﬁrst strategic partnership with 
Brazil, partnership diplomacy has gradually become a major component 
of China's grand diplomacy strategy. According to statistics from the 
Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China (FMPRC), by the end 
of 2017 more than 100 partnerships at various levels had been created. 
That includes countries and regional groups as well as international 
organizations.1 China's initiative to cultivate a partnership network 
started with its attempt to seek partnerships and linkage with major 
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powers, such as the USA, Russia, Japan and the European Union (EU). 
As Avery Goldstein (2001: 846–858) stated in an article published in 2001, 
China's goal was to cope with the constraints of American power in the 
post-Cold War era and hasten the advent of an international system in 
which the USA would no longer be so dominant. 
To fulﬁl its desire to establish a new international order, China sought 
to build a new type of relationship with other countries as an alterna-
tive to the post-Second World War American-based alliance system. 
In 1999, the then Chinese president Jiang Zemin put forward the 'new 
security concept' featuring 'mutual trust, mutual beneﬁt, equality and 
cooperation' (FMPRC 1999). Two years later, the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO), a multilateral security organization, was estab-
lished.2 Its focus has expanded over time to include military security, 
economic development, trade and cultural exchanges (United States 
Congress 2008). This marks the ﬁrst rudimentary step of China's part-
nership network.
However, it is true that the context of China's partnership network 
construction has changed dramatically. Its economic and military capa-
bilities have been greatly improved in the past two decades. International 
inﬂuence is expanding at an unprecedented scale. Intensiﬁed coopera-
tion and exchanges, largely economic, have already started worldwide. 
China is also much more willing to be a 'stakeholder' than ever before 
(Etzioni 2011: 539–553). It is performing actively in global governance 
and hence seeks to reform the prevailing international order by es-
tablishing new institutions. We can see this in the BRI (Belt and Road 
Initiative) and the AIIB (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank). Even 
if China keeps emphasizing that these initiatives are complementary to 
the existing international institutions, the USA still takes them as hard 
evidence that China is a 'revisionist power' (Trump 2018). 
These initiatives proposed by China could not be realized under any 
circumstances without the support and participation of other coun-
tries. As a result, China has to actively improve its relations, especially 
with potential partners. This is the most direct method through which 
China can develop its partnerships. Maintaining a stabilized external 
environment meets China's strategic interests. As an emerging regional 
or even global power, China's rise has created anxiety for many coun-
tries, particularly its neighbours. Through constructing a framework of 
partnerships, China offers its strategic reassurance to its counterparts, 
promising neighbours long-term and harmoniously bilateral relations 
with mutual economic beneﬁts, in exchange for more collegial relations 
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with China. The result should be understanding and support for China's 
goal of a 'peaceful rise', participation in China's international proposals 
and, in an ideal state, the formation of mutual trust and valuing recog-
nition, which will better facilitate China's aspiration of reshaping the 
international order toward a more 'democratic' and 'multi-polarized' 
one (Ni and Wang 2003: 4–30). 
Deﬁning China's Partnership Mechanism
The concept of building state-to-state partnerships was not invented 
by China. Because of the harsh days of the Cold War, many countries 
came to realize that the pursuit of security through alignment could be 
costly, risky and ineffective. Instead, given its ﬂexible and non-bind-
ing nature, partnership allows them to reap certain rewards – namely 
economic and security assistance without the attendant risks of loss of 
autonomy (Ciorciari 2010: 9). As a result, during the post-Cold War pe-
riod the concept of partnership vastly proliferated, with a large number 
of partnerships being established between countries. This involved both 
developing nations and also major powers such as the USA: early in 2004, 
it forged a strategic partnership with India (Zhang 2005: 277–293), and 
more recently during the Obama administration, along with its 'rebal-
ancing' strategy in Asia, the USA signed partnerships agreements with 
Asia-Paciﬁc countries such as Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia and New 
Zealand (Parameswaran 2014: 262–289), as a complementary strategy 
to its Asian alliance system.
There is no doubt that China's partnership formation draws important 
inspiration from some characteristics in Chinese civilization. This can 
be difﬁcult to convey to outsiders but is critically necessary if we are to 
better understand its unique nature (Bolewski and Rietig 2008: 85–86). 
The Chinese phrase Huoban Guanxi (partner relationship) has a more 
extensive meaning than 'partnership': Huoban (partner) originates from 
ancient China's military regulation, referring to a comrade in arms. Only 
those loyal friends who are willing to help whenever necessary, even 
at the risk of their own lives, are qualiﬁed to be taken as Huoban (Men 
and Liu 2015: 65–95). Guanxi (relationship) is a concept embedded in 
the ancient Chinese social philosophy of Confucianism. It describes the 
relationships individuals cultivate with others. It stresses the importance 
of implicit mutual obligations, reciprocity and trust. These serve as the 
fundamental principle in associating oneself with others in a hierarchical 
manner to maintain a certain social order (Zhuang 2012: 18–29). 
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The conception of Guanxi reﬂects the fact that in view of international 
relations, Chinese are prone to have a mental world view as an entity 
solely composed of various types of relationships. More succinctly, 
Guanxi is formed by individuals through their interactions with each 
other (Qin 2016: 19–28). Thus, states should also be considered as in-
dividuals with subjective initiatives: states interact with each other in 
different ways, not only because of their self-interests, but because of 
the restraints of the Guanxi between them. 
China maintains several types of Guanxi with other countries: diplo-
matic relations at heart, guided by principles and provisions that have 
been clearly stipulated in ofﬁcial documents; by contrast, partnership is 
another type of Guanxi, which exceeds the purely diplomatic relations 
and is more complicated. Except for explicit rules, a sound and stable 
partnership requires that the two parties possess certain levels of trust. 
China views its partners not only as sole 'partners' in a commercial 
sense but also as 'friends' and expects the other side to have similarly 
amicable feelings. Such bilateral ties could increase China's leverage 
over its partners by highlighting the advantages of mutually beneﬁcial 
relations. If its partners attempt to take actions that might undermine 
the partnership, they pose immediate harm to the friendship: the cost 
would not only be the tangible loss of economic beneﬁts and cooperation 
on managing strategic matters, but also a 'loss of face'. The betrayal of 
shared moral values could cause the decline of credibility and reputa-
tion, because friends are presumed to support each other. 
Although China is fully aware that the power of moral constraints 
brought by the partnership can be minimal under many circumstances, 
it is still convinced that the cultivation of a partnership requires a cer-
tain period of time. During that time it can offer rewards for both sides 
when fully activated; as long as practical interactions can be carried out 
ﬂuently under the framework of partnership, interests for both sides 
will become further intertwined. This in turn further solidiﬁes Guanxi. 
China hopes that Guanxi will become habit-forming. Therefore, countries 
have to take at least some consideration of the partnership while dealing 
with China. If they make the wrong decision, they risk jeopardizing the 
balance between their long-term and short-term interests with China 
(Medeiros 2009: 82).
It is understandable that there are some fundamental principles that 
have long been enshrined by China in partnership formation. They are 
an integral component of the grand diplomatic strategy. The ﬁrst, and 
foremost, is the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. This rests on 
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mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-ag-
gression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and 
mutual beneﬁt, and peaceful coexistence (FMPRC 2000).
Second, partnership diplomacy requires fully representing the 'friend-
ship' essence in the major conceptions of Chinese foreign policy. As 
Xi Jinping highlighted in many of his speeches, China should foster 
'good-neighbourliness and partnership', follow the principles of 'amity, 
sincerity, mutual beneﬁt and inclusiveness' and build a 'community of 
shared interests and common destiny' in conducting its neighbourhood 
diplomacy.3 While managing its relations with African countries, China 
should adhere to the principles of 'sincerity, practical results, afﬁnity 
and good faith' (Xinhua News Agency 2015a). 
Third, China should 'uphold justice and pursue shared interests by 
giving priority to justice and refrain from seeking interests at the expense 
of justice' while seeking its partnerships with other countries (FMPRC 
2018). Although China still has not ofﬁcially stipulated a clear deﬁni-
tion of partnerships, and their speciﬁc content has varied from case to 
case, we can look to the ofﬁcial documents for guidance. Some general 
commitments can still be found in most of the partnership agreements: 
above all, China's partnership features 'equality, peace and inclusiveness' 
(FMPRC 2014a). This shows that the nature of the partnership is non-
military alliance and not targeting any third party; countries involved in 
partnerships should be committed to building stable bilateral relations; 
promoting extensive economic intercourse and gradually widening the 
scope of cooperation; seeking common ground while shelving differ-
ences by scrupulously taking dialogue as the chief option of managing 
disputes and building mutual trust; working together on matters of com-
mon concern in international affairs; making ofﬁcial contacts routine, 
especially military exchanges and regular meetings including high-level 
dialogue and summits between top government leaders; and enhancing 
cultural and people-to-people exchanges (Dai 2016: 101–116). 
On the basis of these principles and commitments, China uses several 
labels to distinguish the various grades of partnerships. So far, there 
are up to 20 or more of these in China's ofﬁcial partnership lexicon. For 
most observers, what can really be confusing in the nomenclature is that 
there are some key words common to most of the names. Examples are 
'strategic', 'comprehensive' and 'cooperative'; some of the names look 
similar or even identical, with only minor changes in word order, or new 
words being added to an old name. The usage and manner in which 
words are organized and combined in the names of partnerships can be 
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viewed as a manifestation of China's political discourse – the creation of 
Tifa, or 'watchword' (Qian 2012) – in which each name is formulated after 
extensive deliberations and internal debates (Bang 2017: 380–397). In this 
article, the author takes the most widely accepted classiﬁcation method 
adopted in China's partnerships by Chinese scholars as important refer-
ences, and sorts out the three major categories of China's partnership, 
namely, strategic partnership, partnership and potential partnership. 
There are 80 strategic partnerships in the ﬁrst category. They are cen-
tral to the entire network. By emphasizing the feature of 'strategic', 
China wants to indicate that these partnerships should be long-term 
and forward-looking and reﬂect its strategic concerns. These include, 
but are not limited to, China's core national interests – its sovereignty 
and territorial integrity – especially the 'One-China' principle concern-
ing Taiwan, its anti-separatist insistence on Xinjiang and Tibet, and the 
territorial disputes it has with its neighbours; security issues, including 
national security, regional stability and global peace; economic issues 
and international affairs in general. Countries with strategic partner-
ships are expected to have a certain degree of shared strategic necessi-
ties, interests and consensus, and to be willing to cooperate with China 
within certain limits. Evaluating their varied depth and breadth, strategic 
partnerships can be further classiﬁed into six speciﬁc levels. These are: 
comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination, comprehensive strategic 
cooperative partnership, strategic cooperative partnership, comprehensive 
strategic partnership, strategic partnership and strategic cooperative relation-
ship. The hierarchical differences among these partnerships can be very 
difﬁcult to identify simply by judging them linguistically. Instead, one 
must analyse relevant government documents along with observing the 
reality of the countries concerned and their relations with China.
The comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination, regarding China 
and Russia, ranks at the highest level. As described in the joint declara-
tions, this partnership features frequent mutual visits of government 
leaders, institutionalized high-level communication mechanisms at all 
levels concerning energy, trade and investment, regional cooperation, 
law enforcement, strategic security and cultural exchanges; deepening 
political mutual trust represented by ﬁrmly supporting each other on 
issues of sovereignty, security, territorial integrity and national devel-
opment; active interaction regarding the connections of each other's 
national development strategy and participation in international initia-
tives such as BRI and AIIB; close coordination in major international 
and regional issues, and cooperation under multilateral frameworks 
_________________________________________________________________________11
________________________________________Towards a Global Partnership Network
such as the United Nations, G20, Brazil, Russia, India, China, South 
Africa (BRICS), Asia-Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation (APEC), Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Conference on Interaction and 
Conﬁdence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) among others (Xinhua 
News Agency 2014a). The top priority for this partnership, which is 
also what China really relies on, is the high-level consensus it has with 
Russia. Because of the changing global order, and even more important 
the view of the United States, both countries are not comfortable with 
the American hegemonic posture and the unilateralism it insists upon 
in international affairs. They are willing to work together to confront it 
(Smith 2012: 131–180).
By comparison, comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership and 
strategic cooperative partnership are one level lower. Generally, 'compre-
hensive' indicates the scope of cooperation. 'Strategic cooperative' refers 
to a high-level strategic consensus between the two sides. Countries are 
expected to support China. They must work closely in the same direc-
tion and keep frequent communications and negotiations over major 
international and regional issues with China.4 Among the 18 partners 
at this level, 11 of them are Asian countries that are neighbours of or 
geographically close to China. China shows clear intentions of shaping a 
positive environment with its neighbours that favours its own interests. 
The remaining seven partners are all least developed countries (LDCs) 
in Africa, for which China has much less strategic need: their domestic 
development relies heavily upon China's assistance. In the author's 
opinion, the main reason that China is willing to become a high-level 
partner with these countries, from which it has little to beneﬁt, is to 
further expand its inﬂuence in Africa. China seeks to portray itself as a 
'responsible stakeholder' in the international community. As depicted in 
ofﬁcial agreements, China highly values its 'traditional friendship with 
its African brothers' (Xinhua News Agency 2015b). China terms itself 
as a 'developing country', the same as its African counterparts, and is 
prepared to offer 'the most sincere and selﬂess assistance'.5 
By observing these partnerships, we can also see that some countries 
may not completely agree with China. In fact, their relations with China 
can be problematic owing to certain strategic issues. The description of 
strategic cooperative partnership highlights that some strategic problems 
exist, and that both sides are committed to solve them through coopera-
tion; two examples are China's partnerships with the Republic of Korea 
(ROK) and India. Many of the agreements use the same boiler-plate lan-
guage. The reader is advised to be wary of putting too much emphasis 
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on this language as indicative of policy. Language uniquely tailored 
to speciﬁc agreements carries greater weight. In the joint declarations 
with ROK and India, large sections are devoted to stressing speciﬁc 
strategic matters: between China and the ROK, the stability and denu-
clearization of the Korean peninsula as well as the China–Japan–ROK 
trilateral relations are highlighted (The Central Government PRC 2013).
Territorial issues concern China and India. These issues are unlikely 
to be resolved within a short period of time, but are highly sensitive 
and easily cause confrontation if not handled skilfully. It is in China's 
interests to shape a framework of partnership with relevant countries 
so that they are addressed in a peaceful manner and the likelihood of 
escalating disputes is minimized. 
On the next level, in order of importance, there are comprehensive 
strategic partnership, strategic partnership and strategic cooperative relation-
ship. Countries that maintain such partnerships with China are much 
more diverse in type and are located around the world. They reﬂect 
the different strategic considerations that China takes in shaping these 
partnerships: Europe in general is a major focus – with the All-Round 
Strategic Partnership with Germany, Global Comprehensive Strategic 
Partnership for the 21st Century with the UK and the Comprehensive 
Strategic Partnership with France, Italy, Spain and the EU as a whole. 
What China values is not just improved economic cooperation with 
these countries – even though that is very important (Smith 2014: 35–48) 
– but more their geopolitical importance and regional inﬂuence (Rees 
2010: 31–47). As China evaluates its strategic partnership with the EU 
and most European countries, it highlights that the China–Europe 
partnership marks the most sought relations between a newly emerged 
marketing country and the most successful group of developed coun-
tries in the world. The two sides share 'critical strategic consensus on 
the construction of a multi-polarized world' and are 'major forces for 
maintaining global peace and stability' (FMPRC 2014b). However, ow-
ing to the huge ideological gap, there are some strategic disagreements 
that hinder the future improvement of such relations. Some examples 
are human rights issues, the granting of market economy status and the 
lifting of the EU weapon embargo imposed on China in 1989 (Berkofsky 
2006: 185–191). 
Some partnerships involve China's neighbours, with whom China 
has always aspired to have good relations. Some are energy-abundant 
countries that China looks forward to cooperating with in the future. 
Especially in the ﬁeld of energy, these countries are essential to better 
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fulﬁl the demands of China's domestic industrialization. Some coun-
tries are geographically essential to China's international development 
initiatives, particularly countries located along the Silk Road Economic 
Belt and the Maritime Silk Road. If those countries don't allow land or 
maritime transportation access, China's vision of infrastructure connec-
tivity will fail. Other countries are less directly strategically connected to 
China, as indicated in the special modiﬁers of their partnership labels. 
For example, the China–Ireland Strategic Partnership of Mutual Beneﬁt 
emphasizes the mutual beneﬁcial trade ties.6 The China–Switzerland 
Innovative Strategic Partnership (FMPRC 2016) features a special focus 
on bilateral cooperation with regard to high-tech industries. This meets 
the urgent technological demands of the 'made in China 2025' plan.7 
In addition, besides the EU, other major regional groups of countries 
such as the African Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) and the League of Arab States have been included as strategic 
partners. China believes that a closer connection with these multilateral 
mechanisms helps to stabilize its relations with the entire region. It also 
extends its inﬂuence through deepening cooperation with the countries 
involved and better exhibits its effort to advance a 'multi-polarized 
international order' (The State Council PRC 2016).
Under the second category of 'partnership' and third category of 
'take over potential partnership', there are 35 in total. These range from 
comprehensive cooperative partnership, cooperative partnership and friendly 
cooperative relationship to traditional friendly relationship. For all these la-
bels, the word 'strategic' is deliberately left out. Needless to say, these 
relations are much weaker and less signiﬁcant. We can judge this by 
the realities of these countries' relations with China. Either they are not 
strong enough or they are less inﬂuential in the global arena; thus they 
don't have much to offer China. In this sense, China's efforts to maintain 
harmonious relations with them can be simply interpreted as a way of 
demonstrating that China is a 'responsible power' in the international 
community that is always willing to share its development opportuni-
ties with others on the basis of equality. It is also considered as a proof 
of China's fulﬁlment of its own foreign policy values, which is to make 
friends with as many countries as it can. Such bilateral relations still 
heavily rely on economic ties without elevating their status; or China 
may have misgivings about granting higher status to them (Strüver 
2017: 31–65). However, since China's partnership network is a dynamic 
regulation mechanism, these lower level partnerships and relationships 
don't necessarily have to be static for long. Instead, they can be further 
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upgraded so long as there are improvements in bilateral relations or 
new convergence of interests develop, which can be identiﬁed by China 
as evidence to justify renewal of the partnerships. 
Dynamics and Evolution of China's Partnerships
In the past 25 years, China has made concrete efforts in the construc-
tion of its partnerships. But those efforts failed to establish a strategic 
partnership with the USA during the Clinton administration. The Com-
prehensive Strategic Partnership of Coordination with Russia, though, 
has constantly been consolidated and strengthened. China cultivated 
high-level strategic partnerships with most major powers, inﬂuential 
regional groups of countries and international organizations. Some 17 
out of its twenty neighbours have had certain kinds of partnerships 
with China.8 Among all China's partnerships, nearly 40 have been up-
graded, some of which have been renewed more than once. In addition, 
China has been much more willing to accept partners of smaller and 
medium-sized countries, developing countries and LDCs. Examples of 
these are found in Asia, Africa or South America. China has not limited 
its partners to major powers as previously, which is the most noticeable 
change in China's partnership network building.
China's global partnership network now emerges. We can see the 
systematic manner in which different types of partnerships are deﬁned, 
graded and managed. Xi Jinping has frequently said that China strongly 
values its friendship with other countries and will continue to expand 
its partnership circle. The ﬁnal goal is to shape a global partnership 
network (Xinhua News Agency 2014b).
Although the partnership concept ﬁrst appeared as early as 1993, we 
could not discern a grand foreign policy. This changed in 2002. At the 
16th CPC National Congress, China's diplomatic strategy was deﬁned 
as the 'independent foreign policy of peace'.9 It adjusted the top priority 
of foreign relations from the Third World to developed counties (Men 
2009: 205–206). Because China had been isolated since 1989, it realized 
that the only way to become re-engaged in the international community 
was to take the initiative. It sought to repair its relations with Western 
countries. 
In this context, China's partnership diplomacy has experienced an 
explosive growth between 2003 and 2006. Thirty-three partnerships 
have been established. This is three times the number in the previous 
decade. China has greatly extended its network by including several 
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European countries, neighbouring countries, African countries, together 
with the EU, African Union and ASEAN. This marks the ﬁrst stage of 
the enlargement of China's partnership network. 
In 2005, China issued a white paper entitled China's Path of Peaceful 
Development, in which the concept of 'harmonious world' was intro-
duced (The State Council Information Ofﬁce PRC 2005). Since then, it 
has been emphasized repeatedly by the then-president Hu Jintao. This 
suggests that 'China would develop peacefully based on its national 
circumstances, historical and cultural tradition and world development 
trends', 'multilateralism, mutually beneﬁcial cooperation and the spirit of 
inclusiveness should be upheld to realize common security, prosperity, 
and to build a world where all civilizations coexist harmoniously and 
accommodate each other' (FMPRC 2005). The tone has been set for a 
decade-long stable development of China's partnership construction.
The second benchmark for China's partnership diplomacy appeared 
in 2013, and continues to this day. After Xi Jinping took ofﬁce, dramatic 
changes were seen in his announcements of Chinese diplomacy. These 
amount to the 'Chinese Dream'. The goal is to rejuvenate the nation 
into a wealthy and powerful one. A more proactive foreign policy will 
be required, to better match China's international status. As a major 
power, China expects to connect with the outside world more closely, 
for countries are all members of 'the community of common destiny' 
(Xinhua News Agency 2014c). This requires China to take the lead in 
shaping the international order towards a multilateral and democratic 
one which favours the majority. To meet this end, a series of international 
cooperation initiatives have been launched, topped by BRI and AIIB. 
Propelled by this, China's partnership network has expanded. Be-
tween 2013 and 2018, 46 partnerships were established. Several existing 
ones were upgraded. Most of the BRI-related countries and AIIB mem-
bers have established certain types of partnerships with China.10 Over 
80 state-to-state cooperation agreements have also been signed.11
In the report of the 19th CPC National Congress, 'partnership' was 
for the ﬁrst time ofﬁcially stipulated as an important component of 
China's diplomatic strategy. It emphasized that China will 'take a new 
approach to developing state-to-state relations with communication'. It 
will prioritize partnership over confrontation. It also seeks to 'actively 
develop global partnerships and expand the convergence of interests 
with other countries'. Partnership diplomacy will serve as an incentive 
in China's endeavour to engage with the international community in 
the foreseeable future. 
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We still seek evidence regarding the threshold and criteria of China's 
partnerships. What kind of countries are qualiﬁed to be accepted as part-
ners? On what grounds will China upgrade its partnerships with certain 
countries? These are still mysteries to be solved. Owing to the lack of 
an elaborately stipulated code of conduct, new labels for partnerships 
outside the general categories have to be tailored to speciﬁc countries 
in order to meet the varied contexts. This makes the entire mechanism 
even more complicated. There are no deﬁned rules indicating that a 
partnership should start at a lower level, for example a cooperative 
partnership, as a pilot project through which both sides can gradually 
seek to widen the scope of cooperation, intensify their shared interests 
and mutual trust, and expand the partnership to a higher level in a 
more natural manner – even if this is exactly the way in which many of 
China's partnerships are formed. 
But there are several exceptions. During the second high-tide period, 
many countries skipped the fundamental stage and became strategic 
partners directly. It is true that China may have considered some crite-
ria in enrolling countries into its strategic partners' community where 
there was urgency. China's sudden announcement in 2017 of its strategic 
partnership with Djibouti, where China has its ﬁrst overseas military 
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base built, is one such example. But it is still hard to understand the 
criteria used for many new countries that have recently been converted 
into China's strategic partners.
Furthermore, upgrades of existing partnerships can be puzzling. There 
is no ﬁxed term for an upgrade; reasons may vary from case to case. 
The upgrade of a partnership can take as short as one year (e.g. as for 
Australia) or as long as 20 years (e.g. as for Brazil). Some partnerships 
have been renewed up to three times while others never had a chance 
(Sun and Ding 2017: 54–76). As China's subjective perception of its rela-
tions with different countries varies, the upgrades of certain partnerships 
would appear to be a reﬂection of stronger bilateral relations. However, 
it is also true that not all of them are likely to be easily upgraded. 
Consider the controversial but mutually beneﬁcial China–Japan 
strategic relationship and the China–ROK strategic cooperative partner-
ship. Japan and China have had a tense relationship owing to historical 
issues since the Second World War. The outbreak of territorial disputes 
in 2010 exacerbated the tensions of this fragile bilateral relationship and 
undermined the strategic relations that the two sides had built in 2008. 
Between China and the ROK, the worsening situation of the Korean 
peninsula, along with the deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area 
Defense (THAAD), appear to have damaged the foundations of the 
partnership. There is no precedent yet for China 'degrading' any of its 
partnerships. But those it has with Japan and ROK have already become 
merely symbolic: China simply decided to delete any ofﬁcial mention 
of partnerships. However, there are signs of a revival in China's rela-
tions with both Japan and ROK. Recently, 'partnership' reappeared as 
a keyword in the relevant governmental discourse.
Bumpy Road Ahead
China's partnership construction has yielded signiﬁcant achievements 
both in quantity and quality. Its role in China's grand diplomatic strat-
egy is becoming increasingly important. As a major country that holds 
diplomatic relations with almost all countries in the world, it is impos-
sible for China to treat all countries equally. On the contrary, creating a 
'rating system' to evaluate its relations with other countries clariﬁes the 
differences between countries. Using this criterion, China's partnership 
network is indeed a successful one. However, China's ambitious goal of 
expanding its global inﬂuence and exploring potential beneﬁts through 
cooperation will still prove to be fraught with challenges.
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TABLE 2. Overview of China's partnership network (by May 2018)
General 
Category of 
Partnership
Latest 
Partnership & 
Ranking
No.
Country & Latest 
Partnership (since)
Upgrading History of its 
Partnership with China (Duration)
 
Level 1 
Comprehensive 
Strategic 
Partnership of 
Coordination
1 Russia: (2011)
New Type of Constructive 
Partnership (1994–1996) 
 
Strategic Partnership of 
Coordination 
 
(1996–2011)
 
 
2
Pakistan:  
All-weather 
Strategic 
Cooperative 
Partnership (2010)
Comprehensive Cooperative 
Partnership (1996–2005) 
 
Strategic Cooperative Partnership 
(2005–2010)
3 Vietnam: (2008)
4 Cambodia: (2010)
Comprehensive Cooperative 
Partnership (2006–2010)
Level 2 
Comprehensive 
Strategic 
Cooperative 
Partnership
5 Myanmar: (2011)
6 Laos: (2009)
7 Thailand: (2012)
8
Mozambique: 
(2016)
9
Republic of Congo: 
(2016)
Comprehensive Cooperative 
Partnership (2013–2016)
10 Sierra Leone: (2016)
11 Senegal: (2016)
12 Ethiopia: (2017)
Comprehensive Cooperative 
Partnership (2003–2017)
13 Namibia: (2018)
14 Zimbabwe: (2018)
Level 3 
Strategic 
Cooperative 
Partnership
15 ROK: (2008)
Cooperative Partnership (1998–
2003) Comprehensive Cooperative 
Partnership (2003–2008)
16 India: (2005)
17 Sri Lanka: (2013)
Comprehensive Cooperative 
Partnership (2005–2013)
18 Afghanistan: (2012)
Comprehensive Cooperative 
Partnership (2006–2012)
19 Bangladesh: (2016)
Comprehensive Cooperative 
Partnership (2005–2016)
20
Germany:  
All-Round Strategic 
Partnership (2014)
Partnership with Global 
Responsibilities under the 
Framework of China-EU 
Comprehensive Strategic 
Partnership (2004–2010); Strategic 
Partnership (2010–2014);
21
UK: Global 
Comprehensive 
Strategic 
Partnership for the 
21st Century (2014)
Comprehensive Partnership  
(1998–2004); Comprehensive 
Strategic Partnership  
(2004-2014)
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22 France: (2004)
Comprehensive Partnership 
(1997–2004)
23 Brazil: (2012) Strategic Partnership (1993–2012)
24 Denmark: (2008)
25 Spain: (2005)
26 Italy: (2004)
27 Portugal: (2005)
28 Kazakhstan: (2011) Strategic Partnership (2005–2011)
29 Mexico: (2013) Strategic Partnership (2003–2013)
I.
30 South Africa: (2010)
Partnership (2000–2004); 
Strategic Partnership (2004–2010)Strategic
Partnership 31 Greece: (2006)
32 Belarus: (2013)
33 Indonesia: (2013) Strategic Partnership (2005–2013)
34 Peru: (2013) Strategic Partnership (2008–2013)
35 Argentina: (2014) Strategic Partnership (2004–2014)
36 Venezuela: (2014) Strategic Partnership (2001–2014)
37 Malaysia: (2013)
38 Australia: (2014) Strategic Partnership (2013–2014)
39 Algeria: (2014)
Strategic Cooperative Relations 
(2004–2014)
40
New Zealand: 
(2014)
41 Mongolia: (2014)
Good Neighborly Partnership of 
Mutual Trust (2003–2011); 
Strategic Partnership (2011–2014)
42 Egypt: (2014)
Strategic Cooperative Relations 
(1999–2014)
Level 4 
Comprehensive 
Strategic 
Partnership 
43 Tajikistan: (2017) Strategic Partnership (2013–2017)
44 Serbia: (2016) Strategic Partnership (2009–2016)
45 Iran: (2016)
46 Chile: (2016)
Comprehensive Partnership 
(2004–2012); Strategic Partnership 
(2012–2016)
47 Poland: (2016)
Friendly Cooperative Partnership 
(2004–2011); Strategic Partnership 
(2011–2016)
48
Saudi Arabia: 
(2016)
Strategic Cooperative Relations 
(2006–2016)
49 Ecuador: (2016)
50 Hungary: (2017) Friendly Cooperative Partnership 
(2004–2017)
51 Uzbekistan: (2016)
Friendly Cooperative Partnership 
(2004–2012); Strategic Partnership 
(2012–2016)
52
European Union 
(EU): (2003)
Long-Term Stable Constructive 
Partnership (1998–2001); 
Comprehensive Partnership 
(2001–2003)
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53
African Union 
(AU): (2015)
New Type of Strategic Partnership 
(2006–2015)
54 UAE: (2012)
55 Angola: (2010)
56
Turkmenistan: 
(2013)
 57 Nigeria: (2005)
58 Canada: (2005)
59 Ukraine: (2011)
60 Qatar: (2014)
61 Kyrgyzstan: (2013)
62 Tonga: (2014)
63 Uruguay: (2016)
64 Jordan: (2015)
65 Costa Rica: (2015)
Level 5 
Strategic 
Partnership
66 Sudan: (2015)
67 Iraq: (2015)
68
Czech Republic: 
(2016)
69 Djibouti: (2017)
70 Morocco: (2016)
71
Ireland: Strategic 
Partnership of 
Mutual Beneﬁt 
(2012)
72
Switzerland: 
Innovative Strategic 
Partnership (2016)
73
Austria: Friendly 
Strategic 
Partnership (2018)
74 Fiji: (2014)
Key Cooperative Relations 
2006–2014
75 ASEAN: (2003)
76
Paciﬁc Islands 
(including Fiji, 
Samoa, Micronesia, 
Tonga, Vanuatu, 
Papua New 
Guinea, Cook 
Islands, Niue): 
(2014)
77 Philippines: (2005)
Level 6 78 Turkey: (2010) Partnership (2000–2010)
Strategic 
Cooperative 
Relations
79 Brunei: (2013)
80
League of Arab 
States: (2004)
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Level 7 
Comprehensive/
All-Round 
Friendly 
Cooperative 
Partnership
81
Belgium: All-
Round Friendly 
Cooperative 
Partnership (2014) 
82
Romania: 
Comprehensive 
Friendly 
Cooperative 
Partnership (2004)
83 Bulgaria: (2014)
Comprehensive Cooperative 
Partnership 2006–2014
84 Maldives: (2014)
II. 
Partnership
Level 8 
Comprehensive 
Cooperative 
Partnership
85
Singapore: All-
Round Cooperative 
Partnership (2015)
86
China, Japan and 
ROK: All-Round 
Cooperative 
Partnership (2012)
Partnership (2008–2012)
87
Israel: Innovative 
Comprehensive 
Cooperative 
Partnership (2017)
88 Tanzania: (2013)
89 Kenya: (2013)
90 Netherlands: (2014)
91 Nepal: (2009)
Good Neighborly Partnership 
(1996–2009)
92 Croatia: (2005)
93
São Tomé and 
Principe: (2017)
94 Liberia: (2015)
95
East Timor-Leste: 
(2014)
96
Community of 
Latin American and 
Caribbean States: 
(2014)
97 Madagascar: (2017)
98
Finland: New Type 
of Cooperative 
Partnership (2017)
99
Trinidad and 
Tobago: (2013)
Level 9 
Cooperative/
Friendly 
Partnership
100
Antigua and 
Barbuda: (2013)
101
Jamaica: Friendly 
Partnership (2005)
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III. 
Potential 
Partnership
Friendly 
Cooperative 
Relationship
102-
111
Uganda; Colombia; 
Togo; Kuwait; 
Armenia; 
Gabon; Trinidad 
and Tobago; 
Montenegro; 
Azerbaijan; 
Macedonia
Traditional 
Friendly 
Relationship
112-
114
Albania; Samoa; 
Georgia
Strategic 
Relationship of 
Mutual Beneﬁt
115 Japan: (2008)
Source: Archives includes Communiqués and Declarations etc. from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
People's Republic of China, http://www.frnprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/1179_764909/.
The principal problem is that China is not clear about how it intends 
to conduct its partnership network. In David Shambaugh's opinion 
(2000: 97–115), a true strategic partnership should be characterized by 
'an essential similarity of world-view, strategic interests, political sys-
tems, and institutionalized intelligence-sharing and military relations'. 
For China, it can hardly pick out even one among all the partnerships 
it has that meets all these standards. This is so even with Russia. 
China's expected outcomes of the partnership network are paradox-
ical: the economic beneﬁts on the one hand and the ideological consensus 
on the other. Its pursuit of expanding economic beneﬁts worldwide 
reﬂects the 'interest-driven' nature of the partnership, which still serves 
as the major driving force. At the same time, China also wants to exert 
certain ideological inﬂuence on its partners. A danger persists, however, 
that this is wishful thinking: in the reality of international relations, the 
closeness of an economic relationship won't transfer itself automatically 
into an ideological consensus. Under most circumstances, ideological 
recognition only rests among allies. Since China remains far apart ideo-
logically from most of its partners, it may prove extremely difﬁcult to 
advance partnership network along ideological grounds. It could even 
prove counterproductive. If China maintains pressure on ideological 
matters, it risks antipathy among its partners. It also risks jeopardizing 
its own global image, which China has invested quite a lot in establish-
ing and maintaining.
Another major problem for China's partnership is the absence of a 
well-designed system with standardized norms. This has hindered the 
mechanism from being as effective as it could be. Despite certain com-
mitments and principles adaptable for most partnerships, the deﬁning 
features for each type still haven't been clearly stipulated. Most countries 
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that have such partnerships with China are still confused about what 
'strategic' even means. They are puzzled about the proper response.12 
Without adequate practical actions, many partnerships remain sym-
bolic.
Owing to the acceleration of China's partnership construction in recent 
years, the concept of 'strategic partnership' has been vastly abused. This 
risks devaluing its essence. It sends out a misleading signal to those coun-
tries that are strategically important. As more countries have become 
China's strategic partners, their strategic value to China is comparatively 
declining. From this point of view, it is critical for China to realize that 
the hasty expansion of its partnership network is not conducive to its 
long-term development. This requires a thorough review of all exist-
ing partnerships. China can thus even more effectively convert words 
into action. The result will be greater fulﬁlment of its commitments as 
a 'responsible partner'.
Another unavoidable challenge for China is the role of the USA. Ad-
mittedly, the USA still dominates the existing global order. It possesses 
a peerless global alliance system. This overlaps China's partnership 
network to a large extent. However, for those countries which maintain 
both a partnership with China and an alignment with the USA, the 
treaty-bound relationship is still much stronger than a non-binding 
partnership – this is still true to a large extent during the Trump admin-
istration. For most US allies, they may not be satisﬁed with how they 
are being treated by the Trump administration, but they still wish to 
stabilize their relationships with the USA. As the competition between 
China and the USA gets more and more ﬁerce, most countries choose to 
stay away from being directly involved in the competition. Therefore, 
they have no choice but to cautiously adopt a balancing strategy – to 
get on well with both. On the one hand, even though some of them may 
be suspicious about or even oppose the new international institutions 
or initiatives created by China, most of them are willing to maintain or 
even further improve their economic ties with China in order to beneﬁt 
from China's huge domestic market. On the other hand, they are still 
counting on the USA in many ﬁelds, military and security aspects in 
particular, which China is still unable to provide.
In addition, it is undeniable that there are still many more countries 
sharing an ideology with the USA than with China, which puts China 
in a much weaker position. As can be seen, most of the American allies 
embrace democracy and free-market policies, which are highlighted 
by the USA as the lifestyle and core values that should be cherished. 
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However, it seems that the USA is losing its advantage: before China's 
rise, the 'Washington Consensus' was widely recognized and practised 
as the most effective route to national economic development. As China 
emerges as a global power in its own way, the 'Beijing Consensus' has 
been put forward as an alternative, and it is continuously gaining inﬂu-
ence. As China's partnership network continues to grow worldwide, the 
USA is getting worried that its ideological attractiveness will gradually 
become less popular, or in the worst case be ﬁnally replaced by China's. 
With this point in mind, it is no more difﬁcult to understand the current 
hardline US policy towards China: the USA will do whatever it takes to 
defend its own ideology, thus the 'strategic competition' between the two 
countries will continue, or grow, in a predicable future. This may make 
it more difﬁcult for China to conduct its partnership programme.
Besides, since the failure of China's initial attempts to establish a 
'strategic partnership' with the USA, China has sought the formation of 
a new type of major power relationship. The USA is suspicious of this 
and appears unlikely to agree. Nevertheless, without the inclusion, or 
at least the support, of the USA, China's global partnership network is 
incomplete in any global sense. Therefore, there has to be an appropri-
ate arrangement for the USA in China's partnership network if it really 
deserves to be considered 'global'.
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NOTES
1 http://www.china.com.cn/news/2017-01/03/content_40030834.htm. Accessed 15 
January 2018.
2  About the ofﬁcial introduction of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, see 
http://eng.sectsco.org.
3  http://cpc.people.com.cn/xuexi/n/2015/0810/c385474-27435843.htm. Accessed 
15 January 2018.
4  http://opinion.huanqiu.com/1152/2017-04/10453941.html. Accessed 1 April 2018.
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5  http://opinion.haiwainet.cn/n/2018/0404/c353596-31292769.htm. Accessed 25 
May 2018.
6  http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2012/03-28/3780997.shtml. Accessed 25 May 
2018.
7  http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0313/c1002-29142693.htm. Accessed 25 May 
2018.
8  By 2017, only the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Bhutan (Bhutan hasn't 
established a diplomatic relationship with China yet) haven't established any kind 
of partnership with China. There has been a debate about whether Japan's Strategic 
Relationship of Mutual Beneﬁt with China should be taken as a type of partnership; 
however, the author believes that regarding the actual relations between the two 
countries, plus China's trilateral All-Round Cooperative Partnership with Japan 
and ROK, even though there is no clear indication of partnership between the two 
countries, China–Japan relations should at least be considered as a special type of 
potential partnership. It is even more meaningful and important than some existing 
strategic partnerships that China has established with other countries. However, 
owing to historical and territorial disputes that China and Japan have, it is still very 
difﬁcult for the two countries to build an in-depth mutual trust and take each other 
as partners. 
9  http://language.chinadaily.com.cn/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-10/16/con-
tent_32684821.html. Accessed 25 May 2018.
10  https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/index.html. Accessed 25 May 2018.
11  As for the bilateral documents signed between China and other countries under the 
framework of the 'One Belt One Road' initiative, see the ofﬁcial website of the Belt 
& Road. https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn.
12  http://china.cankaoxiaoxi.com/2013/1104/296155.shtml. Accessed 25 May 2018.
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